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Optimal eavesdropping on noisy states in quantum key distribution
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We study eavesdropping in quantum key distribution with the six state protocol, when the signal
states are mixed with white noise. This situation may arise either when Alice deliberately adds noise
to the signal states before they leave her lab, or in a realistic scenario where Eve cannot replace the
noisy quantum channel by a noiseless one. We find Eve’s optimal mutual information with Alice,
for individual attacks, as a function of the qubit error rate. Our result is that added quantum noise
can make quantum key distribution more robust against eavesdropping.
PACS numbers: 03.67.-a,03.67.Dd,42.50.EX
I. INTRODUCTION
In quantum cryptography – or, more precisely, quan-
tum key distribution – a secret key is established between
two trusted parties (Alice and Bob), by employing certain
quantum states as signals, and suitable measurements [1].
In a typical implementation, polarized photons are sent
from Alice to Bob along an optical fiber [2]. An eaves-
dropper (Eve) is usually assumed to have every possible
power that is compatible with the laws of quantum me-
chanics. This power is not necessarily realistic, with re-
spect to existing tools and technology. In particular, Eve
is supposed to be able to replace the quantum channel
(i.e. the optical fiber in our example given above), which
in reality always introduces some noise, by a noiseless
fiber. Even though this assumption is compatible with
quantum mechanics, it is too restrictive from a realist’s
point of view.
In this paper, we will assume that Eve does not possess
a noiseless fiber. Thus, the quantum states will experi-
ence noise in transit from Alice to Bob. We will consider
white noise, where the noise parameter p describes the
best existing fiber that Eve can possibly get hold of. Our
results also hold for the scenario where Alice deliberately
adds noise to the state before sending it out of her labo-
ratory, and the quantum channel is noiseless.
Note that we are considering additional noise at the
quantum level. A related question has been studied in [3]:
there, it has been shown that if one of the parties (Alice
or Bob) adds some noise to their classical measurement
data before error correction, then the BB84 [1], B92 [4]
and six state protocol [5, 6] are more robust with respect
to quantum noise, i.e. the secret key rate is non-zero up
to higher values of the quantum bit error rate. Adding
noise at the quantum level, i.e. before the measurement,
will also lead to additional noise at the classical level. In
this sense our scenario should lead, at least qualitatively,
to a similar result as shown in [3].
The aim of our paper is to present an intuitive under-
standing for the counter-intuitive fact (shown in [3]) that
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noise may help the trusted parties to improve the perfor-
mance of a quantum cryptographic protocol. We will de-
rive the optimal mutual information that Eve can obtain,
when using individual attacks on noisy quantum signals,
and compare it to the mutual information achievable by
eavesdropping on pure states. One expects that Alice
and Bob, but also Eve, will lose some information, due
to the additional noise. It is not evident, however, how
the relation between the two mutual information curves
(Alice and Bob versus Alice and Eve ) changes, when the
noise increases.
In this paper we will discuss the six state protocol
with additional (equal) noise on all signal states. The
six signal states of the protocol with pure states are
{|0x〉, |1x〉, |0y〉, |1y〉, |0z〉, |1z〉}, where |0α〉 and |1α〉 with
α = x, y, z denote the eigenstates of Pauli operator σα.
Here, the states |0α〉 symbolize the classical bit value 0,
and |1α〉 represents the classical bit value 1.
II. EAVESDROPPING ON MIXED STATES
In the six state protocol with mixed states Alice sends
instead of pure states one of the following six mixed states
(either deliberately, or due to unavoidable noise in the
transmission channel):
ρi = (1− p)|i〉〈i|+ p
2
1, i ∈ {0α, 1α} (1)
with α = x, y, z. The parameter p describes the amount
of noise, with 0 ≤ p ≤ 1. Here, we assume the noise to
be equal in all bases, i.e. we study the depolarising chan-
nel. (In a more general model, polarization dependent
noise could be treated in an analogous way, by letting pα
depend on α = x, y, z.)
For the eavesdropping strategy we assume that Eve is
restricted to interfering separately with each of the sin-
gle systems sent by Alice (i.e. individual attack). In this
class of attacks she attaches to each qubit an independent
probe which is initially in the state |X〉 and applies some
unitary transformation. The dimension of the probes and
the interaction are in principle arbitrary, but in [7] it has
been shown that the most general unitary eavesdropping
2attack on a d-dimensional signal state needs only d2 lin-
early independent ancilla states of Eve. (This argument
also holds when the signal states are mixed, as the uni-
tary transformation of the basis states already uniquely
defines the transformation of any superposition, due to
linearity, and thus also of a mixture of projectors onto
superpositions of basis states.) Thus, it is enough for
Eve to use two qubits for her probe states.
The most general unitary transformation U that Eve
can design is defined via its action on the basis states
(where we use for the computational basis the notation
|0〉 = |0z〉 and |1〉 = |1z〉),
U |0〉|X〉 =
√
1−D|0〉|A〉+
√
D|1〉|B〉, (2a)
U |1〉|X〉 =
√
1−D|1〉|C〉+
√
D|0〉|D〉, (2b)
where D is called the disturbance, with 0 ≤ D ≤ 12 .
Eve’s normalized probes after interaction are |A〉, |B〉,
|C〉, and |D〉. They have to be chosen such that U is a
unitary operator.
The quantum bit error rate in the z-basis is denoted as
Qz, and given as the fraction of original signals |0〉(|1〉)
sent by Alice, but interpreted as |1〉(|0〉) by Bob, namely
Qz =
1
2 〈0|ρB1 |0〉+ 12 〈1|ρB0 |1〉, (3)
where ρB
1
and ρB
0
are the states that Bob receives when
Alice sends |0〉 and |1〉, respectively. We define Qx,y in
an analogous way for the x and y-basis.
As we assume the noise to be uniform, a quantum bit
error rate that is basis-dependent indicates the presence
of an eavesdropper. We therefore suppose that Eve uses
a strategy that produces the same quantum bit error rate
in the three different bases, i.e.
Q = Qz = Qx = Qy. (4)
It can be easily verified that the relationship between
the quantum bit error rate Q and D is
Q = D(1 − p) + p
2
. (5)
Additionally, we restrict Eve to attack in such a way that
the two terms of Q are identical, i.e.
〈0|ρB
1
|0〉 = 〈1|ρB
0
|1〉 , (6)
which can be tested by Alice and Bob, by comparing a
part of their bit string for the z-basis. Again, an anal-
ogous requirement has to hold in the other two bases,
too.
Equations (4) and (6), together with the unitarity of
U lead to the four following conditions for Eve’s states:
〈B|D〉 = 0, (7a)
Re〈A|C〉 = 2(1−2Q)2−p−2Q , (7b)
〈A|B〉 + 〈D|C〉 = 0, (7c)
〈A|D〉 + 〈B|C〉 = 0. (7d)
Note that the quantum bit error rate Q only depends
on the scalar product between |A〉 and |C〉. Eve’s two-
qubit states can be written as an expansion of four basis
vectors with complex coefficients. As explained above,
Eve’s states only need to be four-dimensional. We have
the freedom to choose |B〉 = |00〉. Equation (7a) allows
to assign |D〉 one of the other three basis vectors, e.g.,
|D〉 = |11〉. The general expansion for the normalized
vectors |A〉 and |C〉 is
|A〉 = αA|00〉+ βA|10〉+ γA|01〉+ δA|11〉, (8a)
with |αA|2 + |βA|2 + |γA|2 + |δA|2 = 1 , (8b)
and
|C〉 = αC |00〉+ βC |10〉+ γC |01〉+ δC |11〉, (9a)
with |αC |2 + |βC |2 + |γC |2 + |δC |2 = 1. (9b)
We have to determine the free parameters αA, ..., δA and
αC , ..., δC such that Eve’s transformation is optimized.
As a figure of merit we will calculate the mutual infor-
mation between Eve and Alice, and optimize Eve’s trans-
formation such that she acquires the maximal mutual in-
formation.
III. RESULTS
The mutual information measures the information that
two parties share. Here the parties have variables X,Y
that can take values x, y, respectively. The mutual infor-
mation is defined [8] as
IXY =
∑
x,y
p(x, y) log p(y|x)−
∑
y
p(y) log p(y), (10)
where p(x, y) is the joint probability to find x and y, and
p(y|x) is the conditional probability of y, given x. All
logarithms are taken to base 2.
Eve wishes to retrieve the maximal information,
i.e. she has to choose the optimal coefficients
αA,C , βA,C , γA,C , δA,C , for fixed p and Q. The full prob-
lem can be simplified with the following argument: As
mentioned above, for a fixed noise parameter p the quan-
tum bit error rate Q only depends on the real part
of the overlap between |A〉 and |C〉, see equation (7b).
Therefore, Eve is free to choose those states on which
Q does not depend in such a way that her informa-
tion is maximal, as long as the constraints given in
equations (7a)-(7d) are fulfilled. Thus, Eve will choose
her ancilla states orthogonal (whenever possible), i.e.
〈A|B〉 = 〈B|C〉 = 〈A|D〉 = 〈D|C〉 = 0, which corre-
sponds to αA = δA = αC = δC = 0. One realizes by
looking at equation (2a) and (2b) that in this way Eve’s
probe states are made as distinguishable as possible (for
given 〈A|C〉 6= 0). The best measurement for the two
remaining non-orthogonal states |A〉 and |C〉 is rank one
and orthogonal [8, 9].
3With the above definition (10) for the mutual informa-
tion besides the explicit expansions of Eve’s states as in
(8a), (9a), the information that Eve acquires is
IAE = 1 +
1
2
(
1− p2 −Q
1− p ) ·
·
{
τ
[
(1 − p
2
)|βA|2 + p
2
|βC |2 , p
2
|βA|2 + (1− p
2
)|βC |2
]
+ τ
[
(1− p
2
)|γA|2 + p
2
|γC |2, p
2
|γA|2 + (1− p
2
)|γC |2
]}
+ (
Q − p2
1− p ).τ
[
1− p
2
,
p
2
]
, (11)
where we used the definition
τ [x, y] = x log x+ y log y − (x+ y) log(x+ y). (12)
We used the method of Lagrange multipliers for the op-
timization problem. Some details and the equations to
be solved are given in the Appendix.
As sketched in the Appendix, we arrive at |βC |2 =
1− |βA|2. Thus, we find that the maximal mutual infor-
mation between Alice & Eve is
IAE = 1 + (
1− p2 −Q
1− p ).
.
{(
(1− p)|βA|2 + p
2
)
log
(
(1− p)|βA|2 + p
2
)
+
(
1− p
2
− (1 − p)|βA|2
)
log
(
1− p
2
− (1 − p)|βA|2
)}
+ (
Q − p2
1− p )
{p
2
log
p
2
+ (1− p
2
) log (1 − p
2
)
}
, (13)
where
|βA|2 = 12
(
1 + 11− p
2
−Q
√
(Q− p2 )(2 − 3Q− p2 )
)
.(14)
Obtaining the mutual information between Alice and
Bob is an easy task. From the definition of the mutual
information we find
IAB = 1 +Q logQ+ (1−Q) log(1−Q). (15)
One easily confirms that in the absence of white noise,
i.e. for p = 0, the mutual information functions reduce
to the noiseless case described in [5].
We have plotted the mutual information curves IAB
and IAE as a function of the qubit error rate Q in Fig.
1, for an example with p = 0.05. Note that for p 6= 0
both information curves start at a non-zero value for Q,
as we have Q ≥ p/2 from equation (5). In comparison to
the noiseless case the mutual information between Alice
& Eve is lower than without noise. As p increases, IAE
decreases. On the other hand, for increasing p, the mu-
tual information curve for Alice & Bob starts at higher
values for Q, but otherwise remains invariant. Intuitively
speaking, both the trusted and untrusted parties undergo
some degradation of their information, due to the noise.
Which consequence does this have for the creation of a
secret key?
Let us turn our attention to the crossing point between
the two mutual information curves. A secret key can be
established if IAB − IAE ≥ 0 [10], i.e. for values of Q
which are smaller than the value for the crossing point. In
Fig. 1 we observed that for one example of non-zero p the
crossing-point moves towards a larger Q. We therefore
studied the Q-value for the crossing-point as a function of
p. The result is shown in Fig. 2. Remember the relation
between qubit error rate Q, disturbance D and noise p,
given in equation (5). One might expect that the cross-
ing point of the two information curves obeys this linear
dependence, i.e. Qcross = Dcross(1− p) + p/2; this is the
dashed line in Fig. 2. However, the true value for the
crossing point lies above that straight line. Thus, as p in-
creases, the crossing point moves to a higher quantum bit
error rate than expected from the additional noise. So,
by adding noise to the quantum data the secure parame-
ter range of Q will increase. In other words, the six state
protocol with mixed states is more robust against eaves-
dropping than the six state protocol with pure states.
In summary, we have studied individual eavesdropping
attacks on the six state protocol with added white noise.
We found the optimal mutual information between Eve
and Alice, for a fixed amount of noise, as a function of
the qubit error rate. We showed that the crossing point
between the mutual information curves for Alice/Bob
and Alice/Eve (Csisza´r-Ko¨rner threshold) moves to a
qubit error rate that is higher than expected from the
noise alone. Thus, we gave a simple explanation for the
counter-intuitive fact that added noise may improve the
robustness of a quantum key distribution protocol. Our
results are of importance in a realistic scenario, where
the eavesdropper does not have a noiseless fiber avail-
able. Alternatively, Alice can deliberately add noise to
the signal states. In this paper, we have focused on a
particular QKD protocol and a particular type of noise.
As an outlook, it would be interesting to study other
protocols, and/or other types of noise.
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FIG. 1. Mutual information between Alice & Bob and Alice &
Eve for six pure and six mixed state cases, as a function of qubit error
rate (Q) when noise parameter is p = 0.05.
FIG. 2. The solid line is the value of Q for the crossing point of
IAB and IAE , as a function of the noise parameter p. The dashed line
is the straight line that corresponds to equation (5) when D=0.15637.
IV. APPENDIX
Here we briefly explain our method for obtaining the
optimized IAE . First, we redefine the complex coeffi-
cients βA,C , γA,C in polar coordinates:
βA = rβA , (16)
βC = rβC , (17)
γA = rγA exp(iΦγA), (18)
γC = rγC exp(iΦγC ). (19)
Note that because of the unphysical global phase we have
the freedom to choose βA and βC real. Using the La-
grange multiplier method we then write the Lagrangian
L as
L = IAE + λ1g1 + λ2g2 + λ3g3, (20)
where g1,g2 and g3 are the constraints (7b),(8b) and (9b).
The derivative dL = 0 yields the following system of
equations:
g1 = rβArβC + rγArγC cos(ΦγA − ΦγC )
− 2(1− 2Q)
2− p− 2Q = 0, (21)
g2 = rβA
2 + rγA
2 − 1 = 0, (22)
g3 = rβC
2 + rγC
2 − 1 = 0, (23)
rγArγC sin(ΦγA − ΦγC ) = 0, (24)
rβA{(
1− p2 −Q
1− p )((1 −
p
2
) logM2 +
p
2
logM6
− log(M2 +M6)) + 2λ2}+ λ1rβC = 0, (25)
rβC{(
1− p2 −Q
1− p )(
p
2
logM2 + (1− p
2
) logM6
− log(M2 +M6)) + 2λ3}+ λ1rβA = 0, (26)
rγA{(
1− p2 −Q
1− p )((1 −
p
2
) logM3
+
p
2
logM7 − log(M3 +M7)) + 2λ2}
+λ1rγC cos(ΦγA − ΦγC ) = 0, (27)
rγC{(
1− p2 −Q
1− p )(
p
2
logM3
+(1− p
2
) logM7 − log(M3 +M7)) + 2λ3}
+λ1rγA cos(ΦγA − ΦγC ) = 0. (28)
Here,M1, ...,M4 andM5, ...,M8 are the probabilities that
Eve detects |00〉, |10〉, |01〉 and |11〉 while Alice sends ρ0
and ρ1, respectively. The Mi are defined as
M1 =M8 = (1 − p
2
) · Q−
p
2
1− p ,
M2 = (
1 − p2 −Q
1− p ){(1−
p
2
)rβA
2 +
p
2
rβC
2},
M3 = (
1 − p2 −Q
1− p ){(1−
p
2
)rγA
2 +
p
2
rγC
2},
M4 =M5 =
p
2
· Q−
p
2
1− p ,
M6 = (
1 − p2 −Q
1− p ){(1−
p
2
)rβC
2 +
p
2
rβA
2},
M7 = (
1 − p2 −Q
1− p ){(1−
p
2
)rγC
2 +
p
2
rγA
2}.
(29)
It is not straightforward to extract the solution from
this set of equations. We will follow a strategy based
5on analytical and numerical methods. Due to equa-
tion (24) there are two possible solutions, which are
cos(ΦγA − ΦγC ) = 1 and cos(ΦγA − ΦγC ) = −1 (as rγA
and rγC cannot be zero).
Let us first assume the option cos(ΦγA − ΦγC ) = 1.
Note that in this case the set of equations (21) - (28)
is invariant under the simultaneous exchange rβA ↔ rγA
and rβC ↔ rγC . As we can see from equation (11), the
mutual information function is also symmetric under this
exchange. Now, we combine the set of the equations (21)-
(28) to one joint equation in terms of p, Q and rβA
2. The
task is to find all roots for rβA
2. From equations (22)
and (23) we have rγA
2 = 1 − rβA2 and rγC 2 = 1 − rβC 2.
This fact, together with the symmetry mentioned above,
means that there has to be an even number of roots for
rβA
2 (if one finds a solution for r2βA , then 1− r2βA is also
a solution). Numerically (by plotting the joint equation
in terms of rβA
2) we show that for different p and Q
there are always exactly two roots. Analytically, rβC
2 =
1−rβA2 is a possible solution for the equations (22)-(28).
By inserting this expression for rβC
2 as well as rγA
2 and
rγC
2 (see above) into (21) we find two solutions for rβA
2
which are parametrized in terms of p and Q. One of them
is the equation (14), already given in the text, and the
other one is
rβA
2 = |βA|2 = 12
(
1− 11− p
2
−Q
√
(Q− p2 )(2 − 3Q− p2 )
)
.
(30)
Both of them lead to the same mutual information (this
is clear from the symmetry, as explained above). Hence,
we arbitrarily chose the one given in equation (14). Com-
paring analytical and numerical results made us sure that
rβC
2 = 1− rβA2 is the unique relation between rβA2 and
rβC
2.
For the case cos(ΦγA−ΦγC ) = −1, we repeat the above
process. However, equation (21) is now not symmetric
under the exchange rβA ↔ rγA and rβC ↔ rγC . If we
plot the joint function for equations (21)-(28) in terms
of rβA
2, we just find one root, and thus just expect one
solution of the set of equations. Analytically we obtain
rβC
2 = rβA
2 as a possible solution. This leads to the
following mutual information between Alice and Eve:
IAE = (
Q− p2
1− p )
{
1 +
p
2
log
p
2
+ (1− p
2
) log (1− p
2
)
}
.(31)
Comparing the equations (13) and (31) analytically, we
see that for all p and Q the function in (13) is bigger
than (31). Therefore, equation (13) is the optimal mutual
information.
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